Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Dialectic and virtue in Plato's Protagoras
- 2 Ethics and argument in Plato's Socrates
- 3 The speech of Agathon in Plato's Symposium
- 4 Is dialectic as dialectic does? The virtue of philosophical conversation
- 5 What use is Aristotle's doctrine of the mean?
- 6 Aristotle's ethics as political science
- 7 Epieikeia: the competence of the perfectly just person in Aristotle
- 8 Aristotle on the benefits of virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and 9.8)
- 9 Epicurean ‘passions’ and the good life
- 10 Moral responsibility and moral development in Epicurus' philosophy
- 11 ‘Who do we think we are?’
- General bibliography
- List of publications by Dorothea Frede
- Index locorum
- Index nominum et rerum
10 - Moral responsibility and moral development in Epicurus' philosophy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Dialectic and virtue in Plato's Protagoras
- 2 Ethics and argument in Plato's Socrates
- 3 The speech of Agathon in Plato's Symposium
- 4 Is dialectic as dialectic does? The virtue of philosophical conversation
- 5 What use is Aristotle's doctrine of the mean?
- 6 Aristotle's ethics as political science
- 7 Epieikeia: the competence of the perfectly just person in Aristotle
- 8 Aristotle on the benefits of virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7 and 9.8)
- 9 Epicurean ‘passions’ and the good life
- 10 Moral responsibility and moral development in Epicurus' philosophy
- 11 ‘Who do we think we are?’
- General bibliography
- List of publications by Dorothea Frede
- Index locorum
- Index nominum et rerum
Summary
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
For the purpose of this paper, I assume that if a person is morally responsible for an action, this is a necessary and sufficient condition for moral appraisal of that person for that action. For instance, if the action is morally wrong, moral blame is in order. Other morally relevant responses that are sometimes connected with moral responsibility are praise, pardon, shame, pride, reward, punishment, remorse.
I now introduce two quite different concepts of moral responsibility: one grounded on the causal responsibility of the agent for an action, the other on the ability of the agent to do otherwise. The one based on the agent's causal responsibility considers it a necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it was the agent and not something else that brought about the action. The question of moral responsibility becomes one of whether the agent was the or a cause of the action, or whether the agent was forced to act by something else. On this view, actions or choices can be attributed to agents because it is in their actions and choices that the agents, qua moral beings, manifest themselves.
The second idea of moral responsibility considers it a prerequisite for blaming or praising an agent for an action that the agent could have done otherwise.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics , pp. 206 - 229Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
- 6
- Cited by