Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps and Photographs
- Acknowledgements
- List of Acronyms
- Map
- Introduction
- Part 1 War on the Reef
- 1 Beginnings
- 2 Rule of the Gun: THE ANC AND IFP AT WAR
- 3 Rule of the Gun: VIOLENCE ON MULTIPLE FRONTS
- 4 State Security Forces and Township Conflict
- Part 2 Katlehong and Thokoza
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - State Security Forces and Township Conflict
from Part 1 - War on the Reef
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2019
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps and Photographs
- Acknowledgements
- List of Acronyms
- Map
- Introduction
- Part 1 War on the Reef
- 1 Beginnings
- 2 Rule of the Gun: THE ANC AND IFP AT WAR
- 3 Rule of the Gun: VIOLENCE ON MULTIPLE FRONTS
- 4 State Security Forces and Township Conflict
- Part 2 Katlehong and Thokoza
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
There was one constant in the chaos: the certainty that, wherever murders were committed and for whatever reason, police would be blamed. … I do not remember visiting a single site of massacre in South Africa – and there were scores of them – where police were not alleged to have been involved. Eyewitnesses veered wildly between obvious fiction and possible fact, and many seemed unable to distinguish between third-hand hearsay and firsthand observation. Certainly, all of them believed police had been involved; far fewer actually had any evidence of it … Neither I, nor any journalist I know, ever saw policemen fighting alongside Inkatha Party members. But it was never hard to tell which side they were on.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of transition-era conflict was the differing interpretations of the role that state security forces played in this violence, including the impact of ‘third force’ elements. The ANC, violence monitoring groups, human rights organisations and segments of the South African and international media consistently painted a picture of military and police working to manipulate the transition to democracy by provoking violence and assisting the IFP in its conflict with the ANC. The government denied the existence of a state-directed third force and maintained that any anti-ANC operations were the work of errant units and individuals acting without government approval. Negotiations to establish a new constitution and agreement on democratic elections proceeded alongside heated exchanges between the government and the ANC over third force allegations and security force partiality.
It is beyond the scope of this study to gauge the extent of security force transgressions or to assess NP responsibility for covert operations. But it provides a ground-level examination of police and military involvement in these conflicts at an unprecedented level of detail.A key finding is the diversity of security force engagement. A Security Branch operative at Vlakplaas, a police officer based at a township station, an SADF soldier rotating through a township posting and an Internal Stability Division (ISD) member working in a conflict zone had disparate roles and experiences. This occupational difference was further complicated by the race of security force members, their political perspectives and the rapidly shifting political atmosphere. Many township residents, especially ANC supporters, believe that white police backed the IFP.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Township Violence and the End of ApartheidWar on the Reef, pp. 85 - 120Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2018