Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps and Photographs
- Acknowledgements
- List of Acronyms
- Map
- Introduction
- Part 1 War on the Reef
- 1 Beginnings
- 2 Rule of the Gun: THE ANC AND IFP AT WAR
- 3 Rule of the Gun: VIOLENCE ON MULTIPLE FRONTS
- 4 State Security Forces and Township Conflict
- Part 2 Katlehong and Thokoza
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - Rule of the Gun: THE ANC AND IFP AT WAR
from Part 1 - War on the Reef
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2019
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Maps and Photographs
- Acknowledgements
- List of Acronyms
- Map
- Introduction
- Part 1 War on the Reef
- 1 Beginnings
- 2 Rule of the Gun: THE ANC AND IFP AT WAR
- 3 Rule of the Gun: VIOLENCE ON MULTIPLE FRONTS
- 4 State Security Forces and Township Conflict
- Part 2 Katlehong and Thokoza
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This violence was in layers, you remove one and the violence continues. That is why it is difficult to blame someone because there were many people fighting for different things. There were times when the SDUs were fighting amongst themselves and that exacerbated violence. There was also the issue of taxis, ethnicity, township versus the hostel, so many things were going on and one cannot pin one thing down and say this was the problem.
The reality is large elements of South Africa's township population have become ungovernable. No party or organization … has the strength and ability to prevent these areas from falling under the rule of the gun.
Whereas ANC–IFP hostilities represent the defining feature of transition-era conflict on the Rand, a diversity of armed, non-state groups operated with different political orientations, mandates, compositions and relationships with police. The most widespread of these armed entities fell under the loose heading of SDUs. These militias were associated with the ANC, but their relationships with the party varied greatly. It became clear that the ANC had little, if any, control over many SDUs, and it was never able to resolve this problem. Moreover, ANC-aligned structures fought with each other and against AZAPO and PAC activists. As IFP hostels became militarised, all male residents were expected to participate in the defence of the hostels while some younger men were slotted into special fighting units. IFP authority in the hostels was more centralised than ANC authority in the townships, but some IFP militants also engaged in violence that did not further party interests. In his examination of ‘ethnic wars’ in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, John Mueller argues that ‘rather than reflecting deep, historic passions and hatreds, the violence seems to have been the result of a situation in which common, opportunistic, sadistic and often distinctly nonideological marauders were recruited and permitted free rein by political authorities’. Similar circumstances developed in many transition-era townships. Political rivalries and objectives were paramount on the macro level, but acquisitive criminality and local antagonisms often determined conflict on the ground. The common feature shared by all these armed groups was their capacity for violence and the conviction that violence was an effective tool for navigating the challenges of this perilous period.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Township Violence and the End of ApartheidWar on the Reef, pp. 36 - 61Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2018