INTRODUCTION

Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam’s national liberation hero, once said, “Land is the house, sea is the door. How can we protect the house without guarding the door?”. Throughout history, foreign powers cracked open “the door” to Vietnam through sea-borne attacks multiple times. As such, defending Vietnam’s maritime space is of utmost importance, especially since Vietnam’s land borders have been secured through the conclusion of border treaties with Laos (1977), Cambodia (1985) and China (1999).

Vietnam prioritizes the maritime frontier also for reasons beyond historical experience. It is a maritime nation with a coastline of 3,260 km and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of more than 1 million km²—three times the size of its land area. Many of Vietnam’s 3,000 islands and archipelagos are of economic, security and strategic significance. Half of the Vietnamese population resides in 28 coastal provinces, and 80 per cent live within 160 km of the coastline. Economically, Vietnam relies on the South China Sea, which encompasses vital arteries of international commerce through which an estimated one-third of global shipping passes. The South China Sea’s abundant marine resources, including oil reserves, gas, minerals, fisheries, and renewable energy, sustain Vietnam’s galloping economy. The marine economy and coastal cities account for nearly half of the country’s GDP.

Vietnam is a South China Sea disputant and claims sovereignty over the entirety of the Paracel Islands (Hoang Sa) and the Spratly Islands (Truong Sa). There have been voluminous studies done on Vietnam’s perspective on this topic for two main reasons. First, Vietnamese strategists and leaders consider the South China Sea dispute their country’s most pressing national security threat, not least because of China’s recent militarization of disputed features and maritime coercion. Given Vietnam’s power asymmetry, geographical proximity, and troubled history vis-à-vis China, leaders in Hanoi are wary of Beijing’s intentions. Second, scholars and policymakers alike are interested in how small and medium-sized states like Vietnam cope with the intensifying great power competition in the Indo-Pacific, which manifests prominently in the highly contested South China Sea.

However, non-traditional security concerns have also been high on the Vietnamese leadership’s agenda.