This chapter turns to an examination of choice and its hylomorphic structure. To spell out this structure, it further investigates the formal-causal dependence relation between volition and judgment already considered in Chapter 4. It argues that Aquinas draws a distinction between two types of forms, a form extrinsic to the volition, which is the preceding practical judgment, and a form intrinsic to volition, which is the intentional structure that volition inherits from the preceding judgment. It furthermore suggests that the intentional structure of volition involves two components analogous to those present in judgment. There is an attitudinal component analogous to assent in judgment, which Aquinas refers to as “adherence,” and there is also a content adhered to, namely, a means as related to an end. The final section applies this general picture to choice to explain its hylomorphic structure. It argues that choice is a volition whose intrinsic form consists of an attitude of preferential adherence attaching to one means rather than another, where this form is an intentional structure derived from the previous judgment of choice.