Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Abbreviations
- List of Contributors
- John B. Hattendorf – A Transatlantic Tribute
- Introduction
- 1 Spanish Noblemen as Galley Captains: A Problematical Social History
- 2 Strategy Seen from the Quarterdeck in the Eighteenth-Century French Navy
- 3 Danish and Swedish Flag Disputes with the British in the Channel
- 4 Reconsidering the Guerre de Course under Louis XIV: Naval Policy and Strategic Downsizing in an Era of Fiscal Overextension
- 5 British Naval Administration and the Lower Deck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century
- 6 British Naval Administration and the Quarterdeck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century
- 7 The Raison d’Être and the Actual Employment of the Dutch Navy in Early Modern Times
- 8 British Defensive Strategy at Sea in the War against Napoleon
- 9 The Offensive Strategy of the Spanish Navy, 1763–1808
- 10 The Influence of Sea Power upon Three Great Global Wars, 1793–1815, 1914–1918, 1939–1945: A Comparative Analysis
- 11 The Evolution of a Warship Type: The Role and Function of the Battlecruiser in Admiralty Plans on the Eve of the First World War
- 12 The Royal Navy and Grand Strategy, 1937–1941
- 13 The Atlantic in the Strategic Perspective of Hitler and his Admirals, 1939–1944
- 14 The Capital Ship, the Royal Navy and British Strategy from the Second World War to the 1950s
- 15 ‘No Scope for Arms Control’: Strategy, Geography and Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean in the 1970s
- 16 Sir Julian Corbett, Naval History and the Development of Sea Power Theory
- 17 The Influence of Identity on Sea Power
- 18 Professor Spenser Wilkinson, Admiral William Sims and the Teaching of Strategy and Sea Power at the University of Oxford and the United States Naval War College, 1909–1927
- 19 Naval Intellectualism and the Imperial Japanese Navy
- 20 History and Navies: Defining a Dialogue
- 21 Teaching Navies Their History
- Afterword
- A Bibliography of Books, Articles and Reviews Authored, Co-authored, Edited or Co-edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1960–2015
- Index
- Tabula Gratulatoria
2 - Strategy Seen from the Quarterdeck in the Eighteenth-Century French Navy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2016
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- List of Abbreviations
- List of Contributors
- John B. Hattendorf – A Transatlantic Tribute
- Introduction
- 1 Spanish Noblemen as Galley Captains: A Problematical Social History
- 2 Strategy Seen from the Quarterdeck in the Eighteenth-Century French Navy
- 3 Danish and Swedish Flag Disputes with the British in the Channel
- 4 Reconsidering the Guerre de Course under Louis XIV: Naval Policy and Strategic Downsizing in an Era of Fiscal Overextension
- 5 British Naval Administration and the Lower Deck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century
- 6 British Naval Administration and the Quarterdeck Manpower Problem in the Eighteenth Century
- 7 The Raison d’Être and the Actual Employment of the Dutch Navy in Early Modern Times
- 8 British Defensive Strategy at Sea in the War against Napoleon
- 9 The Offensive Strategy of the Spanish Navy, 1763–1808
- 10 The Influence of Sea Power upon Three Great Global Wars, 1793–1815, 1914–1918, 1939–1945: A Comparative Analysis
- 11 The Evolution of a Warship Type: The Role and Function of the Battlecruiser in Admiralty Plans on the Eve of the First World War
- 12 The Royal Navy and Grand Strategy, 1937–1941
- 13 The Atlantic in the Strategic Perspective of Hitler and his Admirals, 1939–1944
- 14 The Capital Ship, the Royal Navy and British Strategy from the Second World War to the 1950s
- 15 ‘No Scope for Arms Control’: Strategy, Geography and Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean in the 1970s
- 16 Sir Julian Corbett, Naval History and the Development of Sea Power Theory
- 17 The Influence of Identity on Sea Power
- 18 Professor Spenser Wilkinson, Admiral William Sims and the Teaching of Strategy and Sea Power at the University of Oxford and the United States Naval War College, 1909–1927
- 19 Naval Intellectualism and the Imperial Japanese Navy
- 20 History and Navies: Defining a Dialogue
- 21 Teaching Navies Their History
- Afterword
- A Bibliography of Books, Articles and Reviews Authored, Co-authored, Edited or Co-edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1960–2015
- Index
- Tabula Gratulatoria
Summary
It is a truth universally acknowledged that historians are prophets of the past. Reporting on naval campaigns whose results are known, historians enjoy a comprehensive understanding of events that enables them to produce a clear and logical narrative. However, this narrative does not necessarily correspond with the seamen's experiences of the same campaigns. Historians have too often taken for granted that those who served on board, from the quarterdeck to the lower deck, were more or less aware of the strategic issues at hand and that they knew the fleet's destination and its objectives. This can be truly illusory and even misleading. I would like to assess the degree of knowledge that captains had about their missions when they set sail and the extent to which admirals were more informed than everyone else on board.
Not unexpectedly, the term strategy was never used in its modern sense. However, a clear, if not necessarily accurate, definition of objectives and means of action did exist at the level of the Conseil du Roi, where operations were decided year after year. What remains to be ascertained is what was communicated or explained to the admirals and captains. What did the officers on the quarterdeck know about what they were expected to do? Had someone at Versailles consulted them prior to ordering naval operations? To answer these questions, we must investigate the instructions given to flag officers or captains, official and individual logbooks, letters and memoirs.
Let us first examine how officers understood the concept of strategy as being something they carried out. However, the lack of being in on the secret did not prevent some officers from expressing their views, and many of them tried to understand the purpose of their missions.
Strategy in Theory and Practice
It should be observed that in France naval officers left behind many treatises on naval tactics or shipbuilding, but not on what we would define today as strategy. This is hardly surprising given that decisions on matters of war and peace – the heart of politics at the time – were made exclusively by the Conseil du Roiat Versailles and were consequently shrouded in mystery. Secrecy and surprise were the mainsprings of victory.
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- Strategy and the SeaEssays in Honour of John B. Hattendorf, pp. 19 - 27Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2016