The Soviets measure performance of their military R&D system by geopolitical gains obtained through acquiring and deploying new weapons. Nuclear weapons and ICBM projects of the 1940s and 1950s are viewed as highly successful because their output (izdelie, “product,” in the slang of oboronka, the Soviet defense industry) changed the geopolitical landscape by exposing for the first time the United States to a potentially devastating attack. While the Soviet geopolitical retreat has been obvious, and Gorbachev has proclaimed that conflicts in the modern era should be solved by political rather than military means, the Soviet/Russian elites have not renounced their claim to a superpower status, and the facts of geography as well as of their nuclear arsenal would hardly let them do so. In consequence, the Soviets still need to perfect their tools of war.

The Soviet military R&D system has been the product of policies and practices from the 1930–1940s. Today the whole Stalinist politicaleconomic system is characterized by extensive entropy. The military R&D system might also be expected to undergo a metamorphosis. This is happening just at a time when Soviet military forecasters foresee a “revolution in military affairs” triggered by emerging radically new technologies. This might mean radically new military R&D requirements, especially in view of Gorbachev's proclaimed doctrinal change from quantity to quality of weapons at the time when the Soviet leaders are concerned about their lagging science and technology.