Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Table of Contents
- Note on Transliteration
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: US-China Relations at a Historic Crossroad
- Part One Background and Lost Voices
- 1 From Admirer to Critic: Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitudes toward the United States
- 2 Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience
- 3 Disillusioned Diplomacy: US Policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945
- Part Two Did America Lose China?
- 4 Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible: A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947
- 5 Negotiating from Strength: US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953
- 6 Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises
- Part Three Rapprochement and Opportunities
- 7 Media and US-China Reconciliation
- 8 Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–1991
- 9 Jiang Zemin and the United States: Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge
- Part Four Did China Lose America?
- 10 China’s Belt-Road Strategy: Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America
- 11 The East and South China Seas in Sino-US Relations
- Conclusion: The Coming Cold War II?
- Index
6 - Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Table of Contents
- Note on Transliteration
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: US-China Relations at a Historic Crossroad
- Part One Background and Lost Voices
- 1 From Admirer to Critic: Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitudes toward the United States
- 2 Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience
- 3 Disillusioned Diplomacy: US Policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945
- Part Two Did America Lose China?
- 4 Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible: A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947
- 5 Negotiating from Strength: US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953
- 6 Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises
- Part Three Rapprochement and Opportunities
- 7 Media and US-China Reconciliation
- 8 Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–1991
- 9 Jiang Zemin and the United States: Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge
- Part Four Did China Lose America?
- 10 China’s Belt-Road Strategy: Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America
- 11 The East and South China Seas in Sino-US Relations
- Conclusion: The Coming Cold War II?
- Index
Summary
Abstract
During the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, the world media was flooded with fear of imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, in both cases, Mao Zedong never intended an actual invasion, and both crises ended through diplomatic compromise. Paying special attention to the memoirs of Chinese military commanders and the newspaper Cankao Xiaoxi, this chapter examines Mao’s decision-making during the Taiwan Strait crises. It attempts to take Mao’s perspective, assess the limits of his calculations, and shed light on the rationales behind Mao’s appearance of aggressiveness. Regardless of militant propaganda, this chapter demonstrates that Mao was extremely cautious not to provoke the US, and never planned to wage large scale warfare against the US or Taiwan.
Keywords: Taiwan Strait Crises, Sino-American Relations, Mao Zedong, Shelling of Jinmen, China-Taiwan Relations
Introduction
In 2020, the world witnessed rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait as China launched ‘gray-zone’ warfare and sent warplanes across the median line (Murray 2020). The US followed suit by dispatching Navy warships to pass through the Taiwan Strait. The media was flooded with concerns of another Taiwan Strait crisis. People wondered if the Xi Jinping administration would invade Taiwan, as well as how the US would respond as events unfolded. Since his inauguration as President of the People’s Republic of China in 2013, Xi Jinping has incorporated a good deal of Mao Zedong’s strategies into his own, and often promoted himself as a great figure. For example, Xi created a ‘Little Red Book’, and made pilgrimages to Yan’an. The current circumstances have reminded us much of the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, in which Mao played a dominant role. However, looking back at both cases, Mao never intended to invade Taiwan (Formosa) nor fight against the US, and both crises ended through diplomatic compromise instead of war.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Sino-American RelationsA New Cold War, pp. 185 - 212Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2022