This book starts with what seems an uncontroversial observation: in spite of impressive economic and technological successes through the first four decades of the twentieth century, it became abundantly clear by 1945 that the German and Japanese brands of capitalism had not worked out very well. Both countries had industrialised more or less effectively. But they remained relatively poor compared with Britain and the United States. They also suffered from extreme social tensions. These factors were both cause and effect of the countries entangling themselves in a war that they could not win, and which made their social and economic situations horrendous, at least initially. Yet, in stark contrast, from the early 1950s onwards, German and Japanese forms of capitalism have played out surprisingly well, with increasing levels of wealth, which was distributed more equitably, and substantially eased social tensions, all of this without any bellicose behaviour. What is more, this remarkable performance has been sustained over an extraordinarily long period of time. The primary question posed in this book, then, is this: Why, in general, have things worked out so much better the second time around? The chapters that follow seek to provide an answer to that simple question.