Kissinger's Strategy of Denial

Kissinger had been preoccupied by Italy since the early 1970s. In November 1970 he would warn Nixon that an electoral victory of the left in Chile would serve as a precedent in other parts of the world, notably Italy. Applying the domino theory he was apprehensive that this trend if spread unchecked would eventually alter the world balance of power.

Kissinger's priority in autumn 1975 was the ‘revitalization’ of Christian Democracy. In early November he delivered a message to this effect to Andreotti, Minister of Finance of the Moro government, and reiterated his position testifying in the House International Affairs Committee: the Christian Democrats should enlist the services of younger and more energetic leaders so that they secured support among the electorate and present themselves as credible allies for the small democratic parties. A new coalition would thus block the entry of Communists to the Italian government, an eventuality gravely encountered by the US Secretary of State as it would destabilize NATO's southern flank.

The emergence of the Eurocommunist current, the claims of Italian, Spanish and French Communists that they were independent from Moscow and accepted in principle political pluralism and alteration in government in the event a communist party was outvoted from office presented puzzling dilemmas for Western policymakers. In an informal meeting of NATO's ‘big four’ Foreign Ministers in December 1975, Callaghan wondered on the expediency of pressing the Italian Communists to declare their independence. He found disadvantages in this course.