Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Notes on the Spelling of Proper Names
- Glossary and Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Enframing Indonesian Concepts of National Security
- Chapter 2 Internal Operations and the Weak Infrastructural Power of the State
- Chapter 3 Strategy and Defence: The Indonesian Approach
- Chapter 4 Formulating a Comprehensive Approach to Defence and National Security Planning
- Chapter 5 Democratic Consolidation and Reform of the TNI in the Post-Suharto Era
- Chapter 6 Conclusion: Redefining National Security
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Chapter 3 - Strategy and Defence: The Indonesian Approach
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Notes on the Spelling of Proper Names
- Glossary and Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Enframing Indonesian Concepts of National Security
- Chapter 2 Internal Operations and the Weak Infrastructural Power of the State
- Chapter 3 Strategy and Defence: The Indonesian Approach
- Chapter 4 Formulating a Comprehensive Approach to Defence and National Security Planning
- Chapter 5 Democratic Consolidation and Reform of the TNI in the Post-Suharto Era
- Chapter 6 Conclusion: Redefining National Security
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
Historical antecedents, geographical setting and a political ideology as well as knowledge that poorly equipped Indonesian forces could never hope to match a technologically advanced invader, have all conspired to mould a unique territorial defence strategy tailor-made for Indonesia's national security needs. As early as 1958, Indonesia's pioneer defence planners devised a doctrine of territorial defence that was based not on retaliation against foreign countries, nor even on conventional military defence along a front, but rather on making Indonesia's own territory hard to conquer.
By the 1980s, however, the Indonesian economy was far more developed than it had been when the territorial defence doctrine was formulated. Since General Murdani's tenure as armed forces commander, Indonesia's defence strategy has incorporated another dimension. Namely, a defence programme that reflects a geostrategic appreciation that the most vulnerable borders of the nation are its maritime zones and the Armed Forces must be prepared to meet the enemy there.
The adoption of this new approach did not imply abandoning the old one as suggested by a recent study. Rabasa and Haseman in their study The Military and Democracy in Indonesia (2002, p. 26) though correct to assert that, at the strategic doctrinal level, a significant shift has taken place by the adoption of the New Paradigm (to be discussed in Chapter 5) in place of the Total People's Defence and Security System (Sishankamrata, Sistim Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta), the authors concerned did not analyse critically how the doctrinal shift would be implemented in practice. Did the TNI's New Paradigm mean a repudiation of the strategic and defence component of the Sishankamrata? Six years have elapsed since the introduction of the New Paradigm in 1999: Has the TNI come up with new doctrines for external defence? While there is a new commitment for the TNI to orientate itself to external defence contingencies, it must be emphasized that a modern strategy has yet to be devised to deal with a situation where Indonesia needs to combat a superior enemy force invading its territory.
- Type
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- Information
- Realpolitik IdeologyIndonesia's Use of Military Force, pp. 177 - 274Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2006