Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Basic Problems of Sociality
- Part II Laws and Explanation in the Social Sciences
- Part III How Philosophy and the Social Sciences Can Enrich Each Other: Three Examples
- 8 Why Do People Cooperate as Much as They Do?
- Comment
- 9 Situations Against Virtues: The Situationist Attack on Virtue Theory
- Comment
- 10 What Kind of Problem is the Hermeneutic Circle?
- Comment
- Epilogue
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
Comment
Going in Circles
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Basic Problems of Sociality
- Part II Laws and Explanation in the Social Sciences
- Part III How Philosophy and the Social Sciences Can Enrich Each Other: Three Examples
- 8 Why Do People Cooperate as Much as They Do?
- Comment
- 9 Situations Against Virtues: The Situationist Attack on Virtue Theory
- Comment
- 10 What Kind of Problem is the Hermeneutic Circle?
- Comment
- Epilogue
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- References
Summary
If there is such a thing as the hermeneutic circle, it is surely at least a circle. In this usage, however, “circle” is a mere metaphor. What is a circle in the sense required by the idea of a hermeneutic circle? The purpose of this comment is to develop a typology for circles in the relevant sense, and thereby show how the idea of a hermeneutic might be shown to be intelligible and what the requirements would be for there to be such a thing. I also address the issue of the need for a hermeneutic circle at all, of any kind, albeit briefly, at the end of the comment.
The hermeneutic circle must have something to do with a characteristic of the relationship between the items that are joined by the circle. So there must be (1) the items so related, and (2) the relations between them. By all accounts, the hermeneutic circle says something about explanation or understanding. So the relation of (2) must be the relation of explaining.
Is the relation in which we are interested really the explaining relation? There is an awful lot of talk in Chrys Mantzavinos's chapter, and in the literature he cites, about understanding. I know of no plausible distinction between understanding and explanation, in advance of a thesis about the irreducible differences between knowledge in, or the methodology of, the natural and social sciences. We cannot start by assuming that understanding and explanation are different ideas.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Philosophy of the Social SciencesPhilosophical Theory and Scientific Practice, pp. 312 - 324Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009