Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of contributors
- Part I Introduction
- Part II The concept of an ecological self
- Part III The interpersonal self and its implications
- 8 The self born in intersubjectivity: The psychology of an infant communicating
- 9 On the interpersonal origins of self-concept
- 10 Infants' knowledge of self, other, and relationship
- 11 The role of feelings for an interpersonal self
- 12 Spontaneous communication and the foundation of the interpersonal self
- 13 Autism, affordances, and the self
- 14 Through feeling and sight to self and symbol
- 15 G. H. Mead and Martin Buber on the interpersonal self
- 16 Cognitive science, other minds, and the philosophy of dialogue
- Author index
- Subject index
16 - Cognitive science, other minds, and the philosophy of dialogue
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of contributors
- Part I Introduction
- Part II The concept of an ecological self
- Part III The interpersonal self and its implications
- 8 The self born in intersubjectivity: The psychology of an infant communicating
- 9 On the interpersonal origins of self-concept
- 10 Infants' knowledge of self, other, and relationship
- 11 The role of feelings for an interpersonal self
- 12 Spontaneous communication and the foundation of the interpersonal self
- 13 Autism, affordances, and the self
- 14 Through feeling and sight to self and symbol
- 15 G. H. Mead and Martin Buber on the interpersonal self
- 16 Cognitive science, other minds, and the philosophy of dialogue
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
The single man for himself possesses the essence of man neither in himself as a moral being nor in himself as a thinking being. The essence of man is contained only in the community and unity of man with man; it is a unity, however, which rests only on the reality of the distinction between I and Thou.
– Feuerbach (1843, p. 71)Philosophy may not tell us how galaxies are born, or what it is that makes squealing and babbling infants squeal and babble. One thing it does well, however, is show us how to question the questions that we begin with whenever we investigate something. And one thing it has tended to reveal over many years of practicing this questionable art is that the form in which we cast our original questions, and the assumptions and models these questions conceal, consistently determine the form in which we frame our answers. Starting points have a tendency to haunt us all the way through to our theoretical conclusions.
In this chapter I shall examine two widely divergent ways to frame epistemological and metaphysical questions about the nature of social and interpersonal relations.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Perceived SelfEcological and Interpersonal Sources of Self Knowledge, pp. 290 - 310Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994
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