Book contents
- Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action
- Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Conceptual Disputes
- 1 Neuroscience and the Explanation of Human Action
- 2 “Nothing but a Pack of Neurons”: The Moral Responsibility of the Human Machine
- 3 Non-Eliminative Reductionism: Not the Theory of Mind Some Responsibility Theorists Want, but the One They Need
- 4 Intention as Non-Observational Knowledge: Rescuing Responsibility from the Brain
- 5 Efficient Causation and Neuroscientific Explanations of Criminal Action
- Part II Epistemic Disputes
- Part III Implications for Courts and Defendants
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - “Nothing but a Pack of Neurons”: The Moral Responsibility of the Human Machine
from Part I - Conceptual Disputes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 April 2018
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Book contents
- Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action
- Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Conceptual Disputes
- 1 Neuroscience and the Explanation of Human Action
- 2 “Nothing but a Pack of Neurons”: The Moral Responsibility of the Human Machine
- 3 Non-Eliminative Reductionism: Not the Theory of Mind Some Responsibility Theorists Want, but the One They Need
- 4 Intention as Non-Observational Knowledge: Rescuing Responsibility from the Brain
- 5 Efficient Causation and Neuroscientific Explanations of Criminal Action
- Part II Epistemic Disputes
- Part III Implications for Courts and Defendants
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
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- Neurolaw and Responsibility for ActionConcepts, Crimes, and Courts, pp. 28 - 70Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018