Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Trachenberg and Reichenbach
- 2 The Silesian Army
- 3 “The infamous conduct of the Prussians”
- 4 Löwenberg
- 5 Goldberg
- 6 The Katzbach
- 7 Blücher’s hare hunt
- 8 “Nothing more remains than to have them shot dead”
- 9 Lusatia
- 10 The Middle Elbe
- 11 The Mulde
- 12 Hide and seek
- 13 Opening round
- 14 “A battle of the most obstinate and sanguinary class”
- 15 Leipzig
- 16 Race to the Rhine
- Assessment
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Lusatia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Trachenberg and Reichenbach
- 2 The Silesian Army
- 3 “The infamous conduct of the Prussians”
- 4 Löwenberg
- 5 Goldberg
- 6 The Katzbach
- 7 Blücher’s hare hunt
- 8 “Nothing more remains than to have them shot dead”
- 9 Lusatia
- 10 The Middle Elbe
- 11 The Mulde
- 12 Hide and seek
- 13 Opening round
- 14 “A battle of the most obstinate and sanguinary class”
- 15 Leipzig
- 16 Race to the Rhine
- Assessment
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
For 11 September, Blücher again planned to push forward only the vanguards. In fact, he remained quite wary, writing to Yorck over the “extreme” necessity of being able to withdraw through the defiles in the region of Bernstadt auf dem Eigen and Herrnhut “in the case that a rapid advance by a superior enemy forces a retreat toward the Neiße.” The reports that arrived early on the 11th indicated that Macdonald’s army remained on the hills both east and west of Bautzen. Before daybreak, Katzler crept as close as possible to the imperial outposts. At first light, he estimated having some 20,000 men in sight. Prisoners confirmed that the troops in front of the Silesian Army belonged to XI, III, and V Corps in addition to Poniatowski’s VIII Corps. Based on these statements, Katzler estimated the total size of Macdonald’s force to be 50,000 men. North of Katzler, Vasilchikov planned to lead Sacken’s vanguard from Wurschen through Litten toward Bautzen in an attempt to move around Macdonald’s left. However, he halted at Litten after observing that Borozdin had not led St.-Priest’s vanguard from Hochkirch toward Bautzen.
Blücher’s commitment to the kleinen Krieg ended in less than thirty-six hours. He changed his mind after receiving several reports including many dispatches found on one of Poniatowski’s captured adjutants claiming that Napoleon had resumed the offensive against Schwarzenberg; Gneisenau agreed. Around 10:30 A.M. on the 11th, Army Headquarters issued new orders. “According to reports,” stated Blücher’s cover letter, “the enemy has turned against the Bohemian Army with his main force. My intention is to drive what stands before me away from Dresden. I know from an intercepted letter that Poniatowski wants to take a position at Neustadt in Sachsen to cover Macdonald’s flank. He must be attacked quickly and destroyed so that the army can turn right and drive the enemy northwest from Bautzen toward Kamenz. With this intent … each commanding officer will proceed and attack the enemy where he finds him.”
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- Napoleon and the Struggle for GermanyThe Franco-Prussian War of 1813, pp. 399 - 450Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015