War and Its Alternatives

Myanmar carries the tragic distinction of hosting the world's longest-running civil wars. These conflicts — some of which commenced almost immediately after the Second World War — have frustrated attempts to bring about lasting and peaceful resolutions. The civil wars colour relations between the country's ethnic minorities, who make up around one-third of the population, and the ethnic Burmans who are the majority. Inter-ethnic battles have seen countless casualties as all sides struggle to defend competing visions of pride, power, and position. But periods of relative stability, without regular violence, have also shaped the political landscape. For the past two decades, Burma's unresolved wars have been characterized, in large part, by ceasefire agreements that discouraged direct hostility and confrontation. The 1988 disintegration of the Communist Party of Burma generated a suite of militia groups, often labelled with the ethnicity of their respective leaderships, that the world came to know through the prism of their ceasefires with the Myanmar government.

Ceasefires with former Communist troops in the Shan State were followed by agreements with other ethnic militias in Kachin, Karen, and Mon areas that offered the government a modicum of nationwide “peace” to bolster plans for national “development”.

A foundational characteristic of Burma's State Peace and Development Council period (1996–2010) was the preponderance of these agreements and the economic, political, and cultural responses that followed. In 2007, Martin Smith, a long-time analyst of ethnic politics in Burma, suggested that “[b]y any international standards, the achievement of ceasefires with so many insurgent groups, in one of the most conflict-torn countries in Asia, has to date been unexpectedly smooth and stable” (Smith 2006, p. 53). He argued that the “simplicity” of the agreements, the general concessions that accompanied most deals, and the prospect of almost immediate and unprecedented economic development, meant the ceasefires “quickly found popular support”. Some ceasefire group leaders fully embraced economic opportunities under the ceasefire stalemates. They built lavish residences, sent their children to posh schools and cultivated commercial relationships well beyond their immediate mountain strongholds.

The ceasefires were designed by Myanmar government strategists to present strong disincentives for any ethnic leaders considering a return to hostilities. According to another long-time observer of ethnic politics, Ashley South, “[t]he regime's intention [was] said to be to promote disillusion with, and provoke disputes within, ethno-nationalist communities, causing armed organisations to lose support” (South 2008, p. 156).