Chapter eight, the conclusion, examines Seneca the Younger’s Stoic critique of Roman exemplarity—particularly (but not only) its moral dimension. From a Stoic perspective, Seneca contends that observing individual actions provides insufficient grounds for judging an actor’s moral status. First, judges evaluating single actions may mistake a virtue for a vice, and so misjudge the actor’s moral state. Second, since Stoic ethics values consistency, a person’s true moral state becomes evident only over time, in the performance of many actions in many contexts; no single action provides sufficient information to ground a valid moral judgment. These Stoic critiques impinge heavily upon three of the four operations of Roman exemplarity as described in the introduction. A Stoic exemplary morality is possible, however, if the four operations are revised and given “appropriate” content. Seneca’s critique reveals that “conventional” exemplarity was by no means uncontested, and shows that formal, theorized philosophy can supply an alternative.