Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- One Classical Athens
- Two The Graeco-Roman world
- Three Early Christianity
- Four The Renaissance: The Reformation
- Five Absolutism: Liberalism
- Six Early feminism
- Seven A welfare society
- Eight The market, laissez-faire and welfare
- Nine Democracy and welfare
- Ten Classical Marxism and welfare
- Eleven Positive freedom and state welfare
- Bibliography
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
Seven - A welfare society
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2022
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- One Classical Athens
- Two The Graeco-Roman world
- Three Early Christianity
- Four The Renaissance: The Reformation
- Five Absolutism: Liberalism
- Six Early feminism
- Seven A welfare society
- Eight The market, laissez-faire and welfare
- Nine Democracy and welfare
- Ten Classical Marxism and welfare
- Eleven Positive freedom and state welfare
- Bibliography
- Index
- Miscellaneous Endmatter
Summary
Rousseau's educational theories would, by themselves, guarantee him a place in a volume of welfare thinkers. His position is strengthened further by his work on poverty and inequality, the role of government in public affairs, his stress on citizen participation and his views on gender issues. We begin, however, with his views on human nature for they are fundamental to his theories elsewhere.
Although there is a tension between some of his major theses (O’Hagan, 2004), on balance, he is essentially a strong advocate of a community of equals where all participate in government decision-making; where they have some property but none too much; and where the satisfaction of basic needs takes precedence over the consumption of luxuries. In such a community of equals, the individual is part of the whole, willing to accept that the interests of the community often take precedence over his interests, knowing that others accept the same condition, too. Rousseau was an advocate of a welfare society rather than of a welfare state.
Human nature
Rousseau rejected Hobbes’ view that human beings are by nature aggressive and egoistic for three main reasons. First, in the state of nature there was enough for everyone to satisfy basic needs; hence any quarrels that may have arisen were not of such significance as Hobbes maintained. Second, he is critical of Hobbes’ concentration on the destructive human passions to the detriment of communitarian passions – compassion, pity, concern for others and for the common good. Third, the strong egoistic human passions that Hobbes referred to were not the result of nature but, like all other social ills, they were the product of civilisation.
He was sympathetic to Aristotle's view that human beings in the state of nature were sociable and prepared to work together for their mutual benefit. He parted company, however, with Aristotle's view that some human beings are by nature superior to others, some destined to rule and others to obey. He felt that Aristotle ‘took the effect for the cause’ (Rousseau, 1762a, p 183). It was the social situation that people found themselves in that made them behave either as leaders or as slaves. Slavery was not the result of natural differences between masters and slaves, according to Rousseau, but a social evil imposed by the strong on the weak.
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- Information
- Major Thinkers in WelfareContemporary Issues in Historical Perspective, pp. 129 - 154Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2010