Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of Contributors
- List of Illustrations
- Introduction to Revised Edition
- Introduction
- Achieving Transformational Change
- The Resolution of Armed Conflict: Internationalization and its Lessons, Particularly in Northern Ireland
- Some Reflections on Successful Negotiation in South Africa
- The Secrets of the Oslo Channels: Lessons from Norwegian Peace Facilitation in the Middle East, Central America and the Balkans
- The Awakening: Irish-America's Key Role in the Irish Peace Process
- ‘Give Us Another MacBride Campaign’: An Irish-American Contribution to Peaceful Change in Northern Ireland
- Towards Peace in Northern Ireland
- Neither Orange March nor Irish Jig: Finding Compromise in Northern Ireland
- Mountain-climbing Irish-style: The Hidden Challenges of the Peace Process
- The Good Friday Agreement: A Vision for a New Order in Northern Ireland
- Hillsborough to Belfast: Is It the Final Lap?
- Defining Republicanism: Shifting Discourses of New Nationalism and Post-republicanism
- Conflict, Memory and Reconciliation
- Keeping Going: Beyond Good Friday
- Religion and Identity in Northern Ireland
- Getting to Know the ‘Other’: Inter-church Groups and Peace-building in Northern Ireland
- Enduring Problems: The Belfast Agreement and a Disagreed Belfast
- Appendices: Key Recommendations of
- 1 The Sunningdale Agreement (December 1973)
- 2 The Anglo-Irish (Hillsborough) Agreement (November 1985)
- 3 The Opsahl Commission (June 1993)
- 4 The Downing Street Joint Declaration (December 1993)
- 5 The Framework Document (1995)
- 6 The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (April 1998)
- 7 The Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission (Sir Kenneth Bloom.eld, 1998)
- 8 The Patten Report (1999)
- 9 Review of the Parades Commission (Sir George Quigley, 2002)
- Index
- Images
‘Give Us Another MacBride Campaign’: An Irish-American Contribution to Peaceful Change in Northern Ireland
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of Contributors
- List of Illustrations
- Introduction to Revised Edition
- Introduction
- Achieving Transformational Change
- The Resolution of Armed Conflict: Internationalization and its Lessons, Particularly in Northern Ireland
- Some Reflections on Successful Negotiation in South Africa
- The Secrets of the Oslo Channels: Lessons from Norwegian Peace Facilitation in the Middle East, Central America and the Balkans
- The Awakening: Irish-America's Key Role in the Irish Peace Process
- ‘Give Us Another MacBride Campaign’: An Irish-American Contribution to Peaceful Change in Northern Ireland
- Towards Peace in Northern Ireland
- Neither Orange March nor Irish Jig: Finding Compromise in Northern Ireland
- Mountain-climbing Irish-style: The Hidden Challenges of the Peace Process
- The Good Friday Agreement: A Vision for a New Order in Northern Ireland
- Hillsborough to Belfast: Is It the Final Lap?
- Defining Republicanism: Shifting Discourses of New Nationalism and Post-republicanism
- Conflict, Memory and Reconciliation
- Keeping Going: Beyond Good Friday
- Religion and Identity in Northern Ireland
- Getting to Know the ‘Other’: Inter-church Groups and Peace-building in Northern Ireland
- Enduring Problems: The Belfast Agreement and a Disagreed Belfast
- Appendices: Key Recommendations of
- 1 The Sunningdale Agreement (December 1973)
- 2 The Anglo-Irish (Hillsborough) Agreement (November 1985)
- 3 The Opsahl Commission (June 1993)
- 4 The Downing Street Joint Declaration (December 1993)
- 5 The Framework Document (1995)
- 6 The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement (April 1998)
- 7 The Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission (Sir Kenneth Bloom.eld, 1998)
- 8 The Patten Report (1999)
- 9 Review of the Parades Commission (Sir George Quigley, 2002)
- Index
- Images
Summary
Since the early nineteenth century Irish-Americans have sought to persuade the White House and Congress to intervene in the politics of Ireland and, after Partition, Northern Ireland. On all occasions they were singularly unsuccessful. There were three reasons for this failure. First, the White House claimed not to intervene in the internal affairs of another sovereign country, a principle of international relations often honoured more in the breach than in the observance by successive US governments. In the case of the United Kingdom, however, it was invariably honoured. In the nineteenth century and until the outbreak of the Second World War, the British Empire was the largest in the world and, following the Second World War, Britain with its ‘special relationship’ was the United States’ most important NATO ally. When questioned about Northern Ireland, the White House religiously echoed the refrain of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs in another country’ and generally supported British policy in Ireland and, later, in Northern Ireland.
The second reason was that initiatives taken in Congress, mainly in the House of Representatives, were unsuccessful. In the early 1980s several attempts at legislative action were made by members of the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs, supported by the Irish National Caucus. They failed because successive speakers of the House and leaders of the Senate controlled the business on the floor of each House and they saw to it that no progress was made on the bills. Particularly in the period following the Northern Ireland civil rights agitation, initiatives on the Hill were blocked as a result of extensive lobbying by the British and Irish embassies and pressure from the White House. John Hume, the leader of the SDLP, who was hostile to the MacBride campaign, decisively influenced Speakers Tip O'Neill and Tom Foley. It was not until 1995 that the affairs of Northern Ireland were subject to an official hearing in the House of Representatives before the Committee on International Relations. It was paradoxical that the hearings were held when the Republicans were in control of the House and not the Democrats, the traditional supporters of the Irish cause. The chairman of the committee, the Republican congressman Benjamin Gillman, was a long-standing member of the Ad Hoc Committee.
The third reason for failure was the almost incestuous relationship that existed between the US state department and the British Foreign Office.
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- The Long Road to Peace in Northern IrelandPeace Lectures from the Institute of Irish Studies at Liverpool University, pp. 78 - 88Publisher: Liverpool University PressPrint publication year: 2007