Introduction

The main argument of this paper is that conscientious exemptions, whether religious or non-religious ones, are better understood as the outcome of tolerance than as a way of applying the principle of equality.

This argument can be read in two different ways. Firstly, it is an analytical argument according to which almost all cases of conscientious exemptions, and surely all central and paradigmatic cases fall within the scope of the principle of tolerance, as I understand the concept. Secondly, not only is tolerance the best way to describe our attitude when we grant conscientious exemptions but in many cases tolerance is also the desirable moral basis for it. This is a normative argument that complements the analytical one. The following discussion will focus on the analytical argument but will also refer to the normative one although without putting forward a detailed reasoning for the latter.

This argument calls for three preliminary notes. The first is about the scope of the concept of ‘conscientious exemptions’. The second is needed for explaining how this paper's argument applies in similar strength both to religious and non-religious conscientious exemptions and the third explains why this argument matters.

The scope of the concept of ‘conscientious exemption’

Granting conscientious exemption is merely one of many ways of protecting freedom of conscience and religion. It is also merely one of many kinds of exemptions that can be granted from the demands of the law.