Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T03:55:54.086Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Part II - CAUSES AND CORRELATES OF PROGRAMMATIC PARTY SYSTEM STRUCTURATION: EXPLAINING CROSS-NATIONAL DIVERSITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Herbert Kitschelt
Affiliation:
Duke University
Kirk A. Hawkins
Affiliation:
Brigham Young University
Juan Pablo Luna
Affiliation:
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
Guillermo Rosas
Affiliation:
Washington University in St. Louis
Elizabeth J. Zechmeister
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
Get access

Summary

Where do national profiles of programmatic party system structuration come from? What are their correlates and consequences and what are their potential implications for the future of democracy in the region, particularly given that we can see a decade beyond our point of observation in the late 1990s and consider intervening developments? Part II is devoted to these causal questions, whereas the conclusion takes up more speculative themes concerning the subsequent development of Latin American politics after the turn of the millennium. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the long-term and short-term developments that might have influenced economic PPS, the most powerful issue dimension in Latin American party systems insofar as they have any programmatic structuration. In Chapter 8, we take up religion and regime as further programmatic dimensions that make a difference in some of our countries.

Long-term causal mechanisms turn out to be decisive in accounting for the rise and tenacity of economic and religious programmatic alignments, whereas regime divides are driven by recent episodes of authoritarianism or manifest performance failures of current democracy. Nevertheless, exceptionally sharp and prolonged economic decline since the 1980s also erodes established economic PPS, at least within the subgroup of countries with favorable long-term conditions for economic PPS. Our analysis, however, suggests that neither good nor bad performance builds up economic PPS in countries with inauspicious long-term dispositions to programmatic party competition.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×