Book contents
- Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Chapter 1 Knowledge from Knowledge
- Chapter 2 Inferential Knowledge from Falsehood
- Chapter 3 Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth
- Chapter 4 Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 5 Testimony and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 6 Memory and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 7 Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Inference, Testimony and Memory
- References
- Index
Chapter 6 - Memory and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 July 2019
- Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Chapter 1 Knowledge from Knowledge
- Chapter 2 Inferential Knowledge from Falsehood
- Chapter 3 Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth
- Chapter 4 Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 5 Testimony and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 6 Memory and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 7 Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Inference, Testimony and Memory
- References
- Index
Summary
In this chapter I present the received view in the epistemology of memory, according to which one only knows p via memory if one knew p at an earlier time. I discuss Jennifer Lackey's counterexamples to this view and address Thomas Señor's criticisms to Lackey's cases. I explain why factual-defeater-based cases of mnemonic knowledge from non-knowledge should not be expected.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Knowledge from Non-KnowledgeInference, Testimony and Memory, pp. 167 - 183Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019