Lucas Thorpe considers three central questions: First, what does it mean, from a Kantian perspective, to be "human" in a morally relevant sense? Thorpe argues that to be "human" in the morally relevant sense is to have the capacity for morality, and that this involves: (a) the capacity to recognize others as ends rather than merely as means and (b) the capacity to enter into relations of ethical community with us. This leaves open a series of questions about how we go about ascribing moral status to others, and what justifies our doing so when we do. In response to these sorts of questions, Thorpe defends a view he calls "moral reliabilism," which includes two components: first, that agents have quasi-perceptual ability to pick up on various types of social affordances, in particular the ability to engage in ethical interaction. Second, the view includes a normative claim that we should assume that this capacity is reliable as a postulate of pure practical reasoning. Thorpe draws on recent research in developmental psychology to support his view.