Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Preface and acknowledgments
- Table of cases
- Table of legislation
- Table of treaties
- 1 The Human Rights Act in contemporary context
- PART I The interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998
- 2 The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act: the view from the outside
- 3 Aspiration or foundation? The status of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the ‘Convention rights’ in domestic law
- 4 Institutional roles and meanings of ‘compatibility’ under the Human Rights Act 1998
- 5 Choosing between sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998: judicial reasoning after Ghaidan v. Mendoza
- 6 Clarity postponed: horizontal effect after Campbell
- 7 The standard of judicial review after the Human Rights Act
- 8 Principles of deference under the Human Rights Act
- PART II The Human Rights Act and substantive law
- Index
2 - The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act: the view from the outside
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Preface and acknowledgments
- Table of cases
- Table of legislation
- Table of treaties
- 1 The Human Rights Act in contemporary context
- PART I The interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998
- 2 The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act: the view from the outside
- 3 Aspiration or foundation? The status of the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the ‘Convention rights’ in domestic law
- 4 Institutional roles and meanings of ‘compatibility’ under the Human Rights Act 1998
- 5 Choosing between sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998: judicial reasoning after Ghaidan v. Mendoza
- 6 Clarity postponed: horizontal effect after Campbell
- 7 The standard of judicial review after the Human Rights Act
- 8 Principles of deference under the Human Rights Act
- PART II The Human Rights Act and substantive law
- Index
Summary
Introduction
When, in the Human Rights Centre, we were first contemplating the ways in which cases under the Human Rights Act (HRA) were being (and should have been) disposed of, it was clear that we had different, in some cases, quite different, conceptions of what the HRA was about and what we could expect from UK judges in applying it. These differences were not restricted to more or less liberal views about what human rights were, or how human rights should be protected in the UK, but about whether the HRA was just another example of a domestic statute implementing the UK's treaty obligations or whether it had the capacity to go beyond the protection of a minimal/minimum understanding of human rights and fundamental freedoms as protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to provide some substitute for the ‘missing’ Bill of Rights in the British constitution.
I approach this matter as an international lawyer, and I take it that, at least, ‘Bringing Rights Home’ meant improving UK co-operation with the ECHR system by providing a better means for resolving disputes about the meaning and application of the ECHR in the UK legal system.
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- Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act , pp. 25 - 56Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
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