Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments to the Second Edition
- Contents
- Introduction to the Second Edition
- I Introduction
- II The Sources
- III The Use of Reason in Religious Debates
- IV Trinity
- V Incarnation
- VI Transubstantiation
- VII Virgin Birth
- VIII Conclusions
- List of Abbreviations
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of Citations
- General Index
III - The Use of Reason in Religious Debates
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments to the Second Edition
- Contents
- Introduction to the Second Edition
- I Introduction
- II The Sources
- III The Use of Reason in Religious Debates
- IV Trinity
- V Incarnation
- VI Transubstantiation
- VII Virgin Birth
- VIII Conclusions
- List of Abbreviations
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of Citations
- General Index
Summary
Before proceeding to the Jewish polemic against specific Christian doctrines, it is necessary to outline the theoretical basis upon which such criticism was made. The Jewish polemicists’ assertion that the central Christian dogmas were illogical and self-contradictory presupposed a firm philosophical foundation for its justification. Similarly the use of philosophical arguments implied a definite view of the relation between religion and reason. How the Jewish polemicists perceived this relationship will be discussed here.
According to the Jewish philosophical polemicists, one of the main differences between Judaism and Christianity lay in the former's conformity to reason and the latter's irrationality. To support this contention, the polemicists developed methods of distinguishing between their own doctrines, which they claimed to be rational, and Christian beliefs, which, they argued, contradicted the findings of reason. An examination of their approach will elucidate the theoretical basis of the various Jewish philosophical critiques of Christianity.
Explanations of Christian Belief in Irrational Doctrines
Jewish theologians sought, in the first place, to render an account to themselves of the phenomenon of Christian belief in rationally unacceptable doctrines. They tried to gain some psychological insight into this kind of belief by pondering the force of training and habit.
This insight appears to have been offered first by Judah Halevi (ca.1075-1141) in the opening passages of his Kuzari, a philosophical defense of Judaism. He began this work with succinct statements of the doctrines of. the philosophers, Christians, Muslims, and Jews, fictionally presented to the King of the Khazars. In rejecting, in turn, philosophy, Christianity, and Islam, the King did not, in fact, address himself to any specific doctrines. For instance, philosophy was rejected because it did not provide an answer to the King's personal quest.2 Similarly, he did not accept Islam because one of its claims to truth was based on the beauty of the Quran, which was written in a language the King did not understand. 3 In his reply to the Christian scholar, the King said:
I see here no logical conclusion; nay, logic rejects most of what you say. If both appearance and experience are so palpable that they take hold of the heart, compelling belief in a thing of which one is not convinced, they render the matter more feasible by a semblance of logic.
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- Jewish Philosophical Polemics Against Christianity in the Middle Ages: With a New Introduction , pp. 25 - 44Publisher: Liverpool University PressPrint publication year: 2007