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7 - Show Me the Cash: Direct Benefits Transfer in India

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 July 2017

Rajesh Chakrabarti
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
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Summary

Two things seem clear. First, if the objective is to alleviate poverty, we should have a program directed at helping the poor. … Second, so far as possible the program should, while operating through the market, not distort the market or impede its functioning. This is a defect of price supports, minimum-wage laws, tariffs and the like.

The arrangement that recommends itself on purely mechanical grounds is a negative income tax. … The advantages of this arrangement are clear. It is directed specifically at the problem of poverty. It gives help in the form most useful to the individual, namely, cash. It is general and could be substituted for the host of special measures now in effect. It makes explicit the cost borne by society. It operates outside the market. Like any other measures to alleviate poverty, it reduces the incentives of those helped to help themselves, but it does not eliminate that incentive entirely, as a system of supplementing incomes up to some fixed minimum would. An extra dollar earned always means more money available for expenditure.

–Milton Friedman in Capitalism and Freedom, 1962

Introduction

India, according to the World Bank, accounts for one third of the poor in the world (Olinto and Uematsu, 2013). Delivering benefits to the deserving recipients have been an old and major problem as well as a source of much corruption in India, since decades before former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's famous observation of only 15 per cent of government outlay actually reaching the poor. India is not unique in this respect; most developing countries have struggled with such distributional issues. In recent years, direct cash transfer schemes have become a much experimented vehicle of distribution of benefits in much of the developing world, mostly with encouraging results. India has also embarked upon this path with characteristic hesitation and arguments. Both the idea of DBT and the delivery mechanism, essentially a unique ID-based transfer system, have generated much debate and skepticism. This chapter seeks to understand the nature and implications of the direct cash transfer programmes being considered and experimented within India, particularly in light of the experience elsewhere.

Type
Chapter
Information
India's Fiscal Policy
Prescriptions, Pragmatics and Practice
, pp. 182 - 210
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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