How punishment may pass to those who have shared in the crime

Whenever question arises in regard to the sharing of punishment, the question concerns either those who are accessories in the wrong, or other persons.

Those who are accessories in the wrong are punished not so much for another's, as for their own, misdeed. Who these are may be seen from our previous discussion of damage unjustly inflicted. In fact, one comes to participation in a wrong in almost the same way as to participation in the infliction of injury.…[A]ny sort of fault may frequently be sufficient to give rise to a liability for damages inflicted.

Therefore, those who order a wicked act, or who grant to it the necessary consent, or who aid it, or who furnish asylum, or those who in any other way share in the crime itself; those who give advice, who praise, or approve; those who do not forbid such an act although bound by law properly so called to forbid it, or who do not bring aid to the injured although bound to do so by the same law; those who do not dissuade when they ought to dissuade; those who conceal the fact which they are bound by some law to make known – all these may be punished, if there is in them evil intent sufficient to deserve punishment, according to the discussion which immediately precedes.