The Introduction provides an overview of the book's main argument, the research design and methodology, and the implications of this book's findings. The book's main argument is that the variation in country offices’ peacebuilding performance results, in part, from informal local accountability arrangements made by individual country-office staff. To create informal local accountability, however, country-office staff must circumvent standard operating procedures put in place to hold them accountable to their headquarters or donors. The basic implication of this argument is that global governors are, ironically and unintentionally, designed to fail at local peacebuilding. To positively perform, these organizations need to delegate authority to local actors who have little power in the global system. But the ability of country offices to delegate this authority to local actors hinges on innovative and entrepreneurial staff who use their own agency to bridge the global-local divide. The improved peacebuilding performance of global governors, thus, rests on their ability to create conducive environments for innovative, potentially rule-breaking, staff to operate at the local level.