How do the dual characteristics of weak global accountability and greater potential for adaptability influence INGO performance at the country level? This chapter shows that INGOs’ lack of singular accountability to states may, in fact, enable their country offices to develop informal local accountability routines more easily than IOs or bilateral donors. The lack of global constraints on INGOs creates an environment in which entrepreneurial country-office staff may have a lot of room to maneuver and innovate, particularly if they can secure funding to do so. Country-office staff could use their agency to create strong informal local accountability routines and, relatedly, develop strong relationships with key actors at both the community and state level. If INGO country offices are also able to find donors who fund peacebuilding interventions (creating formal peacebuilding accountability), then they are likely to learn in relation to their peacebuilding aims. This organizational learning, in turn, significantly increases the chance that the INGOs will achieve their local peacebuilding aims.