This chapter discusses the characteristics of bilateral aid agencies, drawing on the growing literature on the political economy of development aid and examining its relevance for intervention in conflict-affected countries. It describes the crucial case of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), one of the donors most committed to doing conflict-sensitive development in fragile and conflict-affected states. It shows that alterations in the focus of a donor’s formal accountability routines can significantly change the way in which the donor engages with, and learns from, the country context. For example, when DFID Burundi shifted from the prioritization of peacebuilding to the prioritization of development, it no longer achieved peacebuilding performance across its projects, in spite of its expressed commitment to do so. This chapter also shows that the aid industry’s push for the establishment of global standards and targets can undermine the local relevance and effectiveness of international aid, reducing opportunities for informal local accountability and positive peacebuilding performance.