In December 2019, two events related to disinformation received polaropposite responses from the Thai government. The Constitutional Court announced it would rule on a sedition complaint that accused the Future Forward, the second biggest opposition party, of its linkage with the Illuminati who conspires to overthrow the monarchy. Drawn on online hearsay, the petitioner claimed that the Future Forward's upside down triangle-shaped logo was supposedly the evidence for this vile conspiracy (Sivasomboon 2019). In parallel, online disinformation regarding the government's 40 per cent tax hike for female tampons sparked nationwide outrage within hours. The government and its Anti-Fake News Centre immediately threatened to file a lawsuit against the purveyor of disinformation (Bangkokbiznews 2019). These two events illustrate the politics of handling disinformation in Thailand. Future Forward's connection with the Illuminati is virtually baseless and even absurd in view of some staunch conservatives (Weerawan 2019). But the politically-motivated Constitutional Court proceeded with the case that could have resulted in dissolving Future Forward (Macan-Markar 2020a). In contrast, ruling elites swiftly dealt with what it viewed as false information to destabilize the government.

These events reflect a current development of internet-state-society relations that are shaped by protracted political conflicts. In the early stage of internet accessibility, Thailand's cyberspace was relatively open. But as Thai politics has become embroiled in protracted and divisive crises between the pro-establishment and anti-establishment forces, the internet became the site of mobilization for both camps. The establishment moved to curb growing cyber defiance, setting in motion the widespread of repressive policies that plunge Thailand deeper into autocracy. On the other hand, the anti-establishment sees the internet, and social media in particular, as a site of collective resistance to the establishment.

In this chapter, I examine how policies are framed and implemented to address what ruling elites consider the threat of disinformation. I argue that Thailand has taken on the securitization approach to disinformation. Securitization removes what is supposed to be a political matter from the normal political domain into the security sphere. Once an issue is labelled as a “security concern”, the process of policy-making and implementation can evade political deliberations (Wæver 1995).