In Great Britain war with Revolutionary France became a serious public question in the last three months of 1792, when the armies of the newly established republic unexpectedly swept all before them on three fronts. In the South, Savoy and Nice were quickly overrun in September. In the East, the Rhenish towns surrendered one after another to a small force commanded by Custine. In the North, Dumourier's conquest of Belgium was completed by the end of November. These successes profoundly affected British society. They showed, in the first place, that France remained the leading military power in Europe, whatever was once thought of the debilitating effect of revolution. British policy therefore had still to be founded on at least potential membership of an anti-French coalition to defend the country's interests on the Continent, including perhaps the security of allies. As the crisis worsened, the anti-French publicists began to refer to Britain and France as ‘natural’ enemies and looked forward to the impending struggle as the continuation of earlier wars. The second feature of the French victories of 1792 was frighteningly new. Europe had learnt to live with an enormously powerful France, but never with one which flagrantly disregarded the conventions of war and diplomacy and which seemed bent on destroying the old world order. These fears were drawn to the surface by event after event. The annexation of Savoy in November, along with the invasions of Germany and Belgium, suggested that the military might of the republic would be employed in ambitious schemes of national aggrandisement.