Introduction

In the previous chapter I discussed in some detail the general positivist bias of much international relations theory as one of the main reasons for the lack of normative political theory in the discipline. I showed how positivism, and the fact/value dichotomy on which it rests, has come under serious attack in the philosophy of the social sciences and I showed how the main thrust of that attack indicates that it is not possible to do social science without to some extent becoming involved in arguments about the substantive issues in normative political theory. But this positivist bias of the discipline is only a partial explanation for the poverty of theory in this field. It is the aim of the present chapter to look at certain other common assumptions held by theorists in international relations which prevent their taking normative theory seriously. In particular I shall examine certain pervasive assumptions regarding the nature, status and use of substantive value judgements and moral theory in international relations.

There can be little doubt that most scholars in the field of international relations do not consider substantive moral arguments and normative theory to be a worthwhile endeavour and consider them to be suspect in certain ways.