When I wrote Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations (1986) there was a dearth of books dealing with the ethical issues which arise in international relations. International ethics was not a recognized sub-field within the discipline of international relations, and there was a general scepticism as to whether ethics had any place at all within the discipline. This scepticism was surprising given the fact that there was a great deal of scholarly activity directed at ethical issues that arose within states. Some of the key debates concerned justice, liberty, equality, political obligation and democracy. In Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations I explored the reasons (either assumed or expressed) which scholars in international relations had for eschewing normative theory. I found that all the arguments offered (or assumed) did not stand up to close scrutiny. Indeed, I went on to argue that all scholars in the field could do no other but become involved with ethical issues (either expressly or tacitly). This then led me on to examine some of the major ethical positions which tacitly informed much of the scholarship at that time. The key ones were order-based theories, utilitarian theories and rights-based theories. I found all these to be wanting in one way or another, and in their place I put forward a secular Hegelian ethical theory which I called “constitutive theory”.