The South China Sea and its Three Problematiques

Among the reasons why a resolution of the territorial and maritime resource disputes in the South China Sea seems to be nowhere in sight are that there is not one, but many disputes in question; not two but many actors involved; and not one particular issue but several strategic interests at stake. The South China Sea disputes can be described as the confluence of three problematiques.

Primarily, the disputes are a contest for sovereignty and control over specific areas of land and water, as well as over economic resources (fisheries, oil and gas), involving two or more of altogether six claimant parties (Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam). Successful claimants hope to enjoy benefits arising from sovereignty and sovereign rights, as recognized under international law, but such rights and benefits may only be fully enjoyed if uncontested. For this to happen, the different sets of countries whose claims overlap must negotiate boundary limits to reduce/remove the overlaps, or, failing to do so, they should agree to resource-use arrangements and other rules governing activities in disputed areas, that may be pursued even in the absence of a definitive determination of sovereignty or boundaries.

Mistrust of neighbours has clearly been an obstacle to an early resolution of the disputes, attributable to power asymmetry or to historical enmities. However, in some cases strong domestic opposition to any compromise, the absence of a clear-cut national policy, and inadequate capacity to move forward with the technical and legal aspects of the claims have also prevented sustained efforts at dispute management.

Secondly, the disputes are a microcosm of the dilemma in security relations between China on the one hand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the other hand (four of the claimant-states being members of ASEAN, and Taiwan not having the juridical personality to participate in state-level interactions on this issue). The weaker states (ASEAN) realize they must band together to strengthen their influence over the stronger power (China), but fear that this will lead to a perception of ganging up against China and thus elicit greater hostility than may already exist.