Introduction

This final chapter explores some of the ways in which the 1998 Human Rights Act may be made to work for the benefit of disabled children and adults. In any such discussion, it is important to be realistic about the limitations as well as the positive potential of any course of action. The 1998 Human Rights Act has undoubtedly raised expectations and generated considerable excitement. It protects many rights that are of fundamental relevance to disabled people. Nevertheless, it is as well to bear in mind Sir Stephen Sedley's comments prior to the Act coming into force, when he warned that without judicial activism “society's losers and winners will merely become the same losers and winners under a Human Rights Act” (Sedley, 1997, p 458).

Any discussion of the potential impact of the Act on disabled people's human rights, therefore, needs to face four-square, the implications of their relatively powerless position. There is little point in reviewing solely in principle, the potential impact of the Act on disabled people's human rights. Any serious debate must also look at the barriers to making it work for them in practice, together with initiatives which might reduce such impediments – without these, access to justice may prove illusory.

It is not appropriate at this stage to be prescriptive about the action which individuals or organisations should take in order to make the Convention rights a concrete reality in the lives of disabled people, since the debate about the range of approaches and their implications is ongoing. It is, however, important to be clear that in recognising the fact that many disabled people are not best placed to gain access to justice, we are not suggesting that they should be characterised as passive, unable to act on situations affecting their lives, or bereft of opinions on matters which impact on their fundamental rights. The chapter explores three main approaches which should clearly not be regarded as mutually exclusive:

• • redress for individuals;

• • changing the political and public climate;

• • changing practice in public authorities.

Redress for individuals

The significance of the 1998 Human Rights Act lies neither in the introduction of any new rights, nor in any ostensible transformation in perceptions as to what is, or is not, good practice. It is important primarily because it provides a new (and at times more precise) language with which to articulate existing concerns about poor or unacceptable practice.