Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on the contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 ‘A world apart’: gentlemen amateurs to professional generalists
- 2 ‘Experiencing the foreign’: British foreign policy makers and the delights of travel
- 3 Arbitration: the first phase, 1870–1914
- 4 ‘Only a d…d marionette’? The influence of ambassadors on British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914
- 5 Old diplomacy and new: the Foreign Office and foreign policy, 1919–1939
- 6 The evolution of British diplomatic strategy for the Locarno Pact, 1924–1925
- 7 Chamberlain's ambassadors
- 8 The Foreign Office and France during the Phoney War, September 1939–May 1940
- 9 Churchill the appeaser? Between Hitler Roosevelt and Stalin in World War Two
- 10 From ally to enemy: Britain's relations with the Soviet Union, 1941–1948
- Works by Zara Steiner
- Select bibliography
- Index
8 - The Foreign Office and France during the Phoney War, September 1939–May 1940
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on the contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 ‘A world apart’: gentlemen amateurs to professional generalists
- 2 ‘Experiencing the foreign’: British foreign policy makers and the delights of travel
- 3 Arbitration: the first phase, 1870–1914
- 4 ‘Only a d…d marionette’? The influence of ambassadors on British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914
- 5 Old diplomacy and new: the Foreign Office and foreign policy, 1919–1939
- 6 The evolution of British diplomatic strategy for the Locarno Pact, 1924–1925
- 7 Chamberlain's ambassadors
- 8 The Foreign Office and France during the Phoney War, September 1939–May 1940
- 9 Churchill the appeaser? Between Hitler Roosevelt and Stalin in World War Two
- 10 From ally to enemy: Britain's relations with the Soviet Union, 1941–1948
- Works by Zara Steiner
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
Before 1939 Britain, in her search for an accommodation with Nazi Germany, had tended to ignore and disparage France, complaining of the corruption and weakness of the Third Republic, doubting the potential steadfastness in war of the French army and paying little attention to France's security concerns in Europe. However, in 1939 the British, faced with the growing prospect of war with Germany and aware of increasing French demoralisation, turned once again to their ally and attempted, somewhat belatedly, to stiffen her resistance to Germany by embarking on full military collaboration with France. This appeared to have some effect: in March the British ambassador to France, Sir Eric Phipps, reported to London that
an observant visitor to France to-day will find an atmosphere very different from that of 1936, or even of last autumn … To-day there is a feeling that good progress has been made towards a solution of both the financial and economic problem. Although the international situation is full of danger, and weighs heavily on the budget, the market and public opinion, the country is now more united to meet a menace from abroad than for many years past … Finally a most important factor in the revival of confidence has been the steadily growing feeling of the force of Great Britain and of her friendship and loyalty to France.
The reluctance of France to declare war immediately after the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 was not an auspicious beginning to the war-time relationship. This was the first of a series of controversies between the two countries during the ten months of ‘Phoney War’.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Diplomacy and World PowerStudies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–1951, pp. 171 - 196Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996