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9 - Churchill the appeaser? Between Hitler Roosevelt and Stalin in World War Two

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 October 2009

Michael L. Dockrill
Affiliation:
King's College London
Brian J. C. McKercher
Affiliation:
Royal Military College of Canada, Ontario
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Summary

On Bonfire Night, 5 November 1944, a German V-l ‘flying bomb’ landed in Sussex. Nothing surprising in that: southern England had been under fire since June. But this V–l carried propaganda not explosives. Its fourpage leaflet explaining why Britain should sue for peace ended with a V-l shaped crossword. The clues and answers included the following:

He is your enemy, too. Bolshevik.

He wants all you have got. Roosevelt.

Britain has none at inter-Allied conferences. Voice.

At Tehran, Churchill practically did this before Stalin. Knelt.

The claim that Churchill had sold out Britain to America and Russia was a staple of Nazi wartime propaganda. As the Yalta conference was beginning in February 1945, Hitler denounced Churchill for living in the past:

The crucial new factor is the existence of these two giants, the United States and Russia. Pitt's England ensured the balance of world power by preventing the hegemony of Europe – by preventing Napoleon, that is, from attaining his goal … If fate had granted to an ageing and enfeebled Britain a new Pitt instead of this Jew-ridden, half-American drunkard, the new Pitt would at once have recognized that Britain's traditional policy of balance of power would now have to be applied on a different scale, and this time on a world scale. Instead of maintaining, creating and adding fuel to European rivalries Britain ought to do her utmost to encourage and bring about a unification of Europe.

In these final outpourings, Hitler argued that he had given Churchill plenty of opportunity for ‘grasping the truth of this great policy’ and allowing Germany a free hand on the Continent.

Type
Chapter
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Diplomacy and World Power
Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–1951
, pp. 197 - 220
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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