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2 - Analytical Framework

from Part I - A Political Economy Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2023

Faisal Z. Ahmed
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
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Summary

Among political economists, the prevalence dictatorship and civil conflict captures the central features of societies afflicted with political violence. Accordingly, this chapter adopts this terminology and develop an analytical framework to better understand why many Muslim societies are inflicted with varying and heightened levels of political violence. The chapter identifies patterns in dictatorship and civil war in Muslim societies, relative to non-Muslim societies; and how they vary across oil and non-oil producing countries. These empirical patterns motivate a discussion of how variation in preexisting institutional structures and sources of nontax government revenue (rents) may explain these patterns in political violence. This discussion identifies tensions in existing theoretical accounts, leading the author to develop a formal model. The model shows that increases in rents can entrench dictatorship, while a decline in rents may facilitate peaceful transitions to democracy or lead to the outbreak of civil war. Societies whose preexisting institutional structures encourage “sharing” government resources with the opposition are more likely to transition to democracy. The model’s hypotheses form the basis of book’s subsequent empirical analysis.

Type
Chapter
Information
Conquests and Rents
A Political Economy of Dictatorship and Violence in Muslim Societies
, pp. 24 - 60
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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  • Analytical Framework
  • Faisal Z. Ahmed, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Conquests and Rents
  • Online publication: 01 June 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509.003
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  • Analytical Framework
  • Faisal Z. Ahmed, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Conquests and Rents
  • Online publication: 01 June 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509.003
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Analytical Framework
  • Faisal Z. Ahmed, Princeton University, New Jersey
  • Book: Conquests and Rents
  • Online publication: 01 June 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009367509.003
Available formats
×