Our conclusion is that the hazards of the enterprise have considerably increased. Nonetheless, despite our misgivings and our recognition of a worsening of the general situation we are not as yet in a position to question the military advice of those on the spot who in their latest telegram describe the enterprise as not by any means hopeless

[Eden] commenting on the Prime Minister's message, remarked that the real alternative for Greece was whether she should stand up and fight Germany or allow herself to become a victim of German seduction like Roumania … [Eden] and the three commanders-in-chief in turn expressed the view that in spite of the heavy risks involved, it was necessary that we should go ahead in Greece. [Eden] pointed out that if we now withdrew we should have lost once and for all all hope of bringing Yugoslavia into the war and that the effect on the Turkish position might be incalculable …

[Dill] said that the situation was grimmer than we thought. None the less, he saw no alternative but to go ahead with our plans …

Admiral Cunningham and Air Chief Marshal Longmore pointed out that there was a risk of losing most of the convoy ships and most of our air forces in Greece … General Wavell remained of the opinion that provided we could get our forces into Greece there was a good prospect of a successful encounter with the Germans. […]