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93. - Imagination

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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

Imagination (imaginatio, imaginari, imago) is an equivocal term with which Spinoza refers to (1) perceptual states, (2) inadequate ideas, or (3) mental images used in thinking.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

De Deugd, C. (1966). The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge. Van Gorcum.Google Scholar
Garrett, D. (2008). Representation and consciousness in Spinoza’s naturalistic theory of the imagination. In Huenemann, C. (ed.), Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays (pp. 425). Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gatens, M. (2012). Compelling fictions: Spinoza and George Eliot on imagination and belief. European Journal of Philosophy, 20(1), 7490.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
James, S. (2010). Narrative as the means to freedom: Spinoza on the uses of imagination. In Melamed, Y. and Rosenthal, M. A. (eds.), Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide (pp. 250–67). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
LeBuffe, M. (2012). From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Moreau, P.-F. (2021[1994]). Experience and Eternity in Spinoza, trans. Boncardo, Robert. 1st edn. Edinburgh University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Renz, U. (2019). Spinozist cognitive psychology: Spinoza’s concept of the imagination. In Meer, R., Motta, G., and Stiening, G. (eds.), Konzepte der Einbildungskraft in der Philosophie, den Wissenschaften und den Künsten des 18. Jahrhunderts: Festschrift Zum 65. Geburtstag von Udo Thiel (pp. 924). De Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steinberg, D. (2005). Belief, affirmation, and the doctrine of conatus in Spinoza. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 43(1), 147–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steinberg, J. (2018). Two puzzles concerning Spinoza’s conception of belief. European Journal of Philosophy, 26(1), 261–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Toth, O. I. (2018). Memory, recollection and consciousness in Spinoza’s Ethics. Society and Politics, 12(2), 5071.Google Scholar
Vinciguerra, L. 2005. Spinoza et le signe: La logique de l’imagination. J. Vrin.Google Scholar

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