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91. - Idealist Readings

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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

Like most philosophical labels, ‘idealism’ means different things to different people. Often the term describes metaphysical systems in which reality is somehow thought-dependent. Whether Spinoza is an idealist in this priority-of-thought sense (either intentionally or as a result of the poverty of his philosophical resources) has been a point of contention since the nineteenth century.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Deleuze, G. (1992). Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Joughin, Martin. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2008). Rationalism run amok: Representation and the reality of emotions in Spinoza. In Huenemann, C. (ed.), Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays (pp. 2652) Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2012). Rationalism, idealism, monism, and beyond. In Förster, E. and Melamed, Y. (eds.), Spinoza and German Idealism (pp. 726). Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hübner, K. (2015). Spinoza on negation, mind-dependence, and reality of the finite. In Melamed, Y. (ed.), The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making (pp. 221–37). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hübner, K. (2016). Spinoza’s thinking substance and the necessity of modes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(1), 334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melamed, Y. (2012). Why Spinoza is not an eleatic monist (or why diversity exists). In Goff, P. (ed.), Spinoza on Monism (pp. 206–22). Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Newlands, S. (2011). Hegel’s Idealist reading of Spinoza; more recent Idealist readings of Spinoza. Philosophy Compass, 6(2), 100–19.Google Scholar
Newlands, S. (2012). Thinking, conceiving, and Idealism in Spinoza. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 94(1), 3152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parkinson, G. H. R. (1977). Hegel, pantheism, and Spinoza. Journal of the History of Ideas, 38(3), 449–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shein, N. (2020). Spinning strands into aspects: Realism, idealism, and finite modes in Spinoza. European Journal of Philosophy, 28(2), 323–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stern, R. (2016). ‘Determination is negation’: The adventures of a doctrine from Spinoza to Hegel to the British Idealists. Hegel Bulletin, 37(1), 2952.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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