Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-grxwn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-15T00:49:50.797Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

67. - Falsity and Error

from F

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Get access

Summary

The concepts of falsity (falsitas) and error (error) are central to all of Spinoza’s works insofar as it is a major aim of Spinoza to cure us of our (often deeply entrenched) errors or false ideas. In many of his works (most notably in the TIE, KV, and Ethics) Spinoza goes into great detail to teach the means by which he thinks we can detect and overcome our errors or false ideas. Nonetheless, Spinoza’s theory of falsity and error is notoriously elusive and raises serious difficulties.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Recommended Reading

Bennett, J. (1986). Spinoza on error. Philosophical Papers, 15(1), 5973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (1996). Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (pp. 107–17). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garrett, D. (2018). Representation, misrepresentation, and error in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. In Della Rocca, M. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza (pp. 190203). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gueroult, M. (1974). Spinoza, vol. ii: L’Ame (Éthique, 2). Aubier-Montaigne. Especially chap. 10, 301–23.Google Scholar
LeBuffe, M. (2009). Imagination and error. In LeBuffe, , From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence (pp. 7798). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (2007). Spinoza on having a false idea. Metaphysica, 8(1), 1727.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parkinson, G. H. R. (1964). Truth and falsity in Spinoza. In Parkinson, , Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge (pp. 112–37). Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Radner, D. (1971). Spinoza’s theory of ideas. Philosophical Review, 80(3), 338–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steinberg, J. (2018). Two puzzles concerning Spinoza’s conception of belief. European Journal of Philosophy, 26(1), 261–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×