Critical theory is often dismissed (in as much as it is ever contemplated at all) by empirically inclined social scientists as an obscure, speculative, and unscientific philosophical enterprise. Such dismissal is not reserved for critical theory alone, often extending to social and political theory more generally. It must be admitted that there are often good reasons why these social scientists should scorn the efforts of their more philosophically inclined colleagues. But here I shall argue that the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas stands out from most of what now passes for political and social theory in its ability to engage empirical social science in fruitful dialogue.

This dialogue is not just a matter of critical theory issuing philosophical and methodological guidance for the practice of social science, though any social science taking critical theory seriously could hardly emerge from the encounter unaltered. Critical theory can also provide a context and a frame for making sense of existing social science findings. Moreover, the street is a two-way one: Critical theory itself is rightly dependent on social science findings, and Habermas himself has made good (if somewhat sporadic) use of such findings. My discussion begins with the program for social science proposed in Habermas’s earlier epistemological and methodological work. I shall then turn to the more productive influence of Habermas’s later work on communicative action. I conclude with an examination of how critical theory can assimilate and make sense of more established social science research programs.