In the eleven months from the Munich settlement to the outbreak of war in Europe, there were two principal alternatives for British strategic defence policy. The first was Neville Chamberlain's approach. In Europe, this amounted to continued concessions to the dictator states (appeasement by another name), but this strategy was limited, both by the fact that there were fewer and fewer concessions left to give and by the fact that it showed no signs of achieving its goals. In the Far East, it meant accommodation with Japan, but Tokyo's continued aggression meant that accommodation was hard to effect without alienating both public opinion and the United States. The second alternative was to take up arms in conjunction with others and oppose the revisionist Powers. But would Chamberlain accept this? And would the other Powers adhere to such a British policy after years of being snubbed or fobbed off with excuses? France, certainly, had few alternatives, but Soviet Russia had two: it could either retreat into isolation or mend its fences with Germany.

Chamberlain's freedom of action was less during this period than it had been before Munich. Although only Duff Cooper had resigned after Munich, the Cabinet was more restive than before, and small ‘groups’ of parliamentarians – Eden's ‘glamour boys’ (now led by Leo Amery) and Churchill's supporters – who disliked Chamberlain's foreign policy had formed.