Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of figures and tables
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- Part I Getting to grips with the thought styles
- Part II Fixing real people
- Appendix A: Signs and codes
- Appendix B: The amygdala: the brain’s almond
- Appendix C: Statistical primer
- Appendix D: The definition of autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
- Appendix E: Critique of Cunha et al, 2010
- References
- Index
two - How knowledge gets made in neuroscience and molecular biology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2022
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of figures and tables
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- Part I Getting to grips with the thought styles
- Part II Fixing real people
- Appendix A: Signs and codes
- Appendix B: The amygdala: the brain’s almond
- Appendix C: Statistical primer
- Appendix D: The definition of autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
- Appendix E: Critique of Cunha et al, 2010
- References
- Index
Summary
In the preface and opening chapter of the book, we outlined the ways in which technological biologies have joined forces with the enduring project of human improvement. We have hinted that the way biology has flourished of late has been, to a significant degree, a product of a mutually reinforcing configuration of alliances and networks which buttress the biotechnological research agenda, and which also serve to fuel particular ways of thinking about deviance and risk. This chapter provides an introduction to some key concepts from the philosophy and sociology of science, and proceeds to examine two biotechnologies in depth to reveal how the underlying sciences ‘think’ and construct knowledge. We review two exhibits, ‘neuroscientism’, a form of thought affording neuroscience a privileged worldview, and the ‘epigenetic’ thought style. We begin with a brief excursion into the philosophy and sociology of science which will help us understand how science gets made within scientific communities. This will enable interrogation of the presuppositions and supporting assumptive bases of our two principal exhibits, which are exerting a foundational influence on social policy.
Facts and thought styles
The idea that science is a human and social matter, progressing through episodes of settled thinking, punctuated by fundamental change, is well established. The work of the influential philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn (1962), may be familiar to many readers. Kuhn conceived of science in terms of ‘paradigms’ (ways of thinking and doing science) that, at any one historical period, define what counts as ‘normal science’ for that epoch. He saw scientific change in terms of ‘revolutions’, or major shifts in ways of thinking, which Hacking describes as follows:
Normal science … proceeds in a rather inevitable way. Certain problems are set up, certain ways for solving them are established. What works is determined by the way the world collaborates or resists. A few anomalies are bound to persist, eventually throwing science into a crisis, followed by a new revolution. (Hacking, 1990: 97)
By putting thinking in its historical context, Kuhn is widely proclaimed as one of the pioneers in the social study of science. Yet, as Hacking (1990) notes, he had very little to say about the detail of social interaction in scientific communities, and its role in the production of either paradigms or revolutions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Blinded by ScienceThe Social Implications of Epigenetics and Neuroscience, pp. 25 - 60Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2017