Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Basic elements of a model and definitions of stability
- 3 System stability and the balance of power
- 4 Resource stability and the balance of power
- 5 Preventive war
- 6 Geography, balancers, and central powers
- 7 Great-power alliance formation, 1871–1914
- 8 European conflict resolution, 1875–1914
- 9 Summary and conclusions
- References and selected bibliography on European great-power relations, 1871–1914
- Index
5 - Preventive war
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Basic elements of a model and definitions of stability
- 3 System stability and the balance of power
- 4 Resource stability and the balance of power
- 5 Preventive war
- 6 Geography, balancers, and central powers
- 7 Great-power alliance formation, 1871–1914
- 8 European conflict resolution, 1875–1914
- 9 Summary and conclusions
- References and selected bibliography on European great-power relations, 1871–1914
- Index
Summary
What made the [Peloponnesian] war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (trans. Warner 1954, p. 49)The great wars of history – we have had a world war about every hundred years for the last four centuries – are the outcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of nations.
Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (1962, pp. 1–2)Whether to invest in additional power resources or to consume some of those that have been accumulated is a perennial issue of foreign policy. Many of the most important choices governments face have to do with the relative weight given to consumption … versus investment, and with devising strategies for action that are both viable in the short run and capable of achieving wealth and power objectives in the long run.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984, p. 24)Intuition and a considerable theoretical and empirical literature concur with Thucydides' assertion that the cause of international conflict lies as much with differential growth rates in resources as with the relative power or resources countries enjoy at any specific point in time. Hence, conflicts might not be attributable wholly to some current “imbalance” in military position, but also to the projections of future imbalances and to a corresponding perception by some that only a preventive war can guarantee their security. Indeed, so compelling is the threat of imbalance owing to the growth of some potential adversary, that even domestic constraints on aggressive action and sentiments for peace can be quickly swept aside. As forcefully argued by McNeill (1982, p. 309):
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Balance of PowerStability in International Systems, pp. 146 - 186Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1989