Discernible rhetorical disposition

By disposition, I mean the intentional arrangement of the speech according to conventional sections which attempts best to foster favorable attention and persuasion in the audience. Different terms for disposition include partes-system, τάξις, arrangement, composition, collatio, distribution, division, and organization (Carrino, 1959). George H. Goebel (1983, pp. 201–202) argues that “Disposition is a matter of the end rather than the means – what point you want to make rather than how you make it – and it is no accident that the ancient rhetorical handbooks almost invariably define the main parts of the speech according to the purposes they serve.”

It is important to understand, as Goebel's definition indicates, that disposition was an extremely critical component in the rhetorical process. Enos (1985, p. 109) summarizes Cicero's view of the matter: “Throughout his career Cicero saw arrangement as central to composition, believing that invention is localized, that ideas must be appropriate not only to the situation but also to the proper place within the discourse.” This is arguably true for the earliest orators and rhetorical theorists.

Nevertheless, disposition as a feature of ancient rhetoric surprisingly is devalued or ignored by current interpreters. There are two reasons for this. First, Plato and Aristotle disparaged speech disposition (Pl. Phaedr. 266de–267a; Arist. Rhet. 3.13.3, 5; cf. 2.26.5). Both do so explicitly in criticism of the dispositional teaching of Theodorus. Aristotle reduced disposition to two components: prothesis and proof (Rhet. 3.13.1–3). (In actuality Aristotle allowed for more; see below.)