Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations and Glossary
- Introduction
- Chapter One American Foreign Policy and the End of Dutch Colonial Rule in Southeast Asia: An Overview
- Chapter Two “It’s 1776 in Indonesia”
- Chapter Three The United States and the Dutch East Indies: the Celebration of Capitalism in West and East during the 1920’s
- Chapter Four American Visions of Colonial Indonesia from the Great Depression to the Growing Fear of Japan,1930-1938
- Chapter Five The Specter of Japan and America’s Recognition of the Indonesian Archipelago’s Strategic Importance,1938-1945
- Chapter Six The Politics of Independence in the Republik Indonesia and International Reactions,1945-1949
- Chapter Seven The Emerging Cold War and American Perspectives on Decolonization in Southeast Asia in the Postwar Era
- Chapter Eight Indonesia’s Struggle for Independence and the Outside World: England, Australia, and the United States in Search of a Peaceful Solution
- Chapter Nine Armed Conflict,the United Nations’Good Offices Committee, and the Renville Agreement: America’s Involvement in Trying to Reach a Settlement
- Chapter Ten Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia and Indonesian Politics:US Foreign Policy Adrift during the Course of 1948
- Chapter Eleven Rescuing the Republic’s Moderates from Soviet Communism: Washington’s Conversion to Unequivocal Support of Indonesia’s Independence
- Epilogue
- Archival Sources and Selective Bibliography
- Sources of Illustrations
- Notes
- Index
Epilogue
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations and Glossary
- Introduction
- Chapter One American Foreign Policy and the End of Dutch Colonial Rule in Southeast Asia: An Overview
- Chapter Two “It’s 1776 in Indonesia”
- Chapter Three The United States and the Dutch East Indies: the Celebration of Capitalism in West and East during the 1920’s
- Chapter Four American Visions of Colonial Indonesia from the Great Depression to the Growing Fear of Japan,1930-1938
- Chapter Five The Specter of Japan and America’s Recognition of the Indonesian Archipelago’s Strategic Importance,1938-1945
- Chapter Six The Politics of Independence in the Republik Indonesia and International Reactions,1945-1949
- Chapter Seven The Emerging Cold War and American Perspectives on Decolonization in Southeast Asia in the Postwar Era
- Chapter Eight Indonesia’s Struggle for Independence and the Outside World: England, Australia, and the United States in Search of a Peaceful Solution
- Chapter Nine Armed Conflict,the United Nations’Good Offices Committee, and the Renville Agreement: America’s Involvement in Trying to Reach a Settlement
- Chapter Ten Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia and Indonesian Politics:US Foreign Policy Adrift during the Course of 1948
- Chapter Eleven Rescuing the Republic’s Moderates from Soviet Communism: Washington’s Conversion to Unequivocal Support of Indonesia’s Independence
- Epilogue
- Archival Sources and Selective Bibliography
- Sources of Illustrations
- Notes
- Index
Summary
Approximately twenty-four hours before the Netherlands government in The Hague authorized its second military campaign against the Indonesian Republic, George Kennan had a confidential conversation in Washington DC focusing specifically on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict with the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, and his Under Secretary, Robert Lovett.Their discussion was based on a memorandum Kennan had previously submitted on behalf of the Policy Planning Staff.On December 17,1948,Kennan stressed that the most significant issue facing the United States in its Cold War with the Soviet Union, at that very moment,was located in the faraway Indonesian archipelago. He reminded his senior policymaking colleagues that whatever they decided to do with regard to the Dutch-Indonesian confrontation “within the next few days may strongly influence the shape of things in East and South Asia for decades to come.”
Kennan sketched a bird's eye view of communism's future in Asia. He mentioned that both the American and British governments had gathered convincing intelligence, indicating that the Dutch could not successfully maintain their political authority over Sumatra, Java, and Madura. America's policy dilemma, therefore, revolved around the social and political turmoil that threatened the Indonesian Republic, not only during the ongoing independence struggle but also after autonomy as a nation-state would be achieved;“chaos,” after all, always embodied “an open door”to communist infiltration.
Kennan then posed an appropriate rhetorical question:“What would a communist Indonesia mean?” He speculated that it might result in either Thailand's or the Malay Peninsula's failure to stay within the orbit of the West, because they would be wedged in between “the nutcracker of a communist China and Indochina and a communist Indonesia.” He also speculated that anarchy in the Indonesian Republic might result in a “bisection”of the world,which could,in due course, stretch from Siberia to Sumatra. If Marshall and Lovett were to take a quick glance at a world atlas, they should recognize at once that such a development could lead to “the communist denial of our East-West global communications.” Kennan also worried about Australia. If the Indonesian people were to fall prey to communism,it would render the position of the British Commonwealth outpost in Asia “critically vulnerable.”
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- American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/IndonesiaUS Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism 1920–1949, pp. 294 - 305Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2002