

(1) *By Annie Besant*: 'Arjuna said: Beholding again Thy gentle human Form, O Janardana, I am now collected, and am restored to my own nature'.

(2) *By Swami Swarupananda*: 'Arjuna said: Having seen this Thy gentle human Form, O Janardana, my thoughts are now composed and I am restored to my nature'.

(3) *By Profesor Radhakrishnan*: 'Arjuna said: Beholding again this Thy gracious human Form, O Janardana (Krishna), I have now become collected in mind and am restored to my normal nature'.

And the goal of the teaching of the Bhagavadgita? According to Professor Radhakrishnan it is this:

'The Gita insist on the unity of the life of spirit, which cannot be resolved into philosophic wisdom, devoted love or strenuous action. Work, knowledge and devotion are complementary, both when we seek the goal and after we attain it. We do not proceed on the same lines, but that which we seek is the same. We may climb the mountain by different paths, but the view from the summit is identical for all. Wisdom is personified as a being whose body is knowledge and whose heart is love. Yoga, which has for its phases knowledge and meditation, love and service, is the ancient road that leads from darkness to light, from death to immortality'.

TONI SUSSMAN.

MORAL INTUITION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-REALISATION. By C. A. Campbell. Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust. British Academy, 1948. (Cumberlege, Oxford University Press; 5s. 6d.)

This Hertz Trust lecture is divided into two parts. Part I deals with the question of moral intuition, and especially with the conditions which are required before it can be accepted as valid; Part II is concerned to show that a principle, known as the 'principle of "self-realisation"' fulfils these conditions.

As a conclusion to Part I we are presented with the statement 'that whatever the ultimate principle of man's moral consciousness may be, it cannot be one in which the aspect of social universality is intrinsic'. Whether this assertion is true or not it certainly requires more precise argumentation in support of it than Campbell provides, especially since he relies so much upon anthropological evidence. To treat the findings of anthropologists (different customs, codes and systems of morality, etc.) as though they were, in themselves, the data of ethics is highly misleading; the real difficulty, indeed the essential task, is to distinguish between the denotation and the connotation of valuational terms; it is only then that the 'findings' can become data of ethics.

The basis for Part II seems to rest upon Hume's notion that 'disinterested benevolence' belongs to 'the original frame of our temper'. It is a little surprising to find anyone accepting such a view in 1948.

D. NICHOLL.